Article III, Section 1: Judicial Vestment Clause
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Just as Article I begins with a clause vesting all legislative power in Congress, and Article II begins with a clause investing all executive power in the President, so Article III begins with a clause vesting all judicial power in the Supreme Court and its inferior courts, which constitute the federal judiciary.
Article III, Section 1 consists of a single clause divisible into two subclauses. The first subclause is the Judicial Investment Clause proper, establishing a single Supreme Court and granting Congress authority to establish such courts inferior to the Supreme Court as it sees fit. These courts hold all judicial power under the Constitution.
The second subclause establishes the independence of the judiciary as a distinct third branch of government, breaking with the old tradition of courts as an arm of the executive or the more recent American experiment with courts as creatures of the legislature. Once a judge is appointed to either the Supreme or an inferior court, he holds permanent tenure and his compensation cannot be diminished. He can only be removed from office for flagrant misconduct, and the Constitution elsewhere provides for such removal exclusively by the process of impeachment and Senate trial.
Federal judges have been the targets of most formal impeachments. Of 21 articles of impeachment passed by the House over the course of the nation’s history, fifteen were for federal judges, and no impeachment has yielded a conviction except for federal judges. Eight have been so removed, and another three resigned before their Senate trials. In each of these three cases, the Senate dismissed the impeachment, which gives some color to the claim that the Senate should not try defendants who are no longer in office. (We consider this precedent unfortunate.) Three of the four acquitted were impeached on vague charges of “abuse of power”, while most of those convicted were impeached on straightforward corruption charges. Two of the fifteen were judges of the Supreme Court, and one of these was acquitted.
It is an interesting question whether it would be constitutional for Congress to remove a judge from office by the expedient of dissolving his court. We lean towards the view that it would not. The clause calls for inferior courts to be ordained and established, strongly suggesting that inferior courts are expected to be permanent once created. Dissolving a court, then immediately recreating it, thereby effectively dismissing its current judges, would obviously be a ploy to get around the tenure of judges. However, a reorganization of the inferior courts that did not leave a judge without an assignment might fulfill the technical requirements of the Constitution; for example, three courts might be merged into two so long as all judges of the original three courts retain their seats on the remaining two. Likewise, Congress might in principle choose to reduce the size of a court rather than replace a retiring or deceased judge.