Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

This clause prescribes the possible penalties following conviction in a Senate trial. There are two possible political penalties, and the clause further stipulates that these are distinct from, and do not preclude, any legal penalties.

The first penalty is removal from office. This is understood to follow automatically from conviction by two-thirds vote. The impeached official is immediately removed from office as soon as a guilty verdict is returned.

The second penalty is disqualification to hold any further office under the United States. This does not automatically follow from conviction. The precedent set in early Senate trials is that this penalty is voted for separately, after conviction, and is imposed by a simple majority in favor. The penalty is permanent; the President is explicitly denied the power to pardon a Senate conviction, and there is no other mechanism mentioned in the Constitution for removing disqualification from office.

The House has impeached 20 officials in its history. In four cases, the official resigned and the Senate chose not to hold a trial. In eight other cases, the Senate convicted the accused, but only three were disqualified from holding future office. The other trials all resulted in acquittals. All eight convictions were of Federal judges.  One of the judges removed from office, but not disqualified, is now a sitting Congressman.

Both removal and disqualification from future office are strictly political penalties, though disqualification is the most severe political penalty possible. A person convicted in a Senate trial and disqualified from further office is permanently removed from a career in politics, other than his right as an ordinary citizen to vote in elections or to campaign for candidates.  The clause explicitly forbids any penalty of a criminal or civil nature  as a result of conviction by the Senate. The judgment returned by the Senate is intended to remove a threat to the constitutional order, rather than to punish the guilty per se.

However, it is entirely possible that a political crime warranting one or both of these political penalties is also a statutory crime warranting criminal penalties. The clause explicitly permits such penalties, but only following trial and conviction in a regular court of law. The presumption is that such a trial would be held following the Senate trial, in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.

Thus, a President who committed murder could be removed from office by the Senate, and could then face a criminal trial in a regular federal court for the crime of murder. Upon conviction in the second trial, he could be sentenced to imprisonment or execution, like any other murderer.